with 8-bit internal processors. This fact played an important role in the tentative selection by Singaporean planners of SAFER K 128 as the standard cipher within the island wide information system being planned for the turn of the century. A prototype smart-card implementation of SAFER was found there to run about 2.5 times as fast as a fully optimized smart-card implementation of the Data Encryption Standard DES.
We have received several enquiries about our reasons for choosing the`logarithm' and`exponential' functions to provide the`nonlinearities' in SAFER that are required for good`confusion'. To answer these questions, we give in Section 3 an analysis to show that these functions well resemble`randomly chosen' functions. Further justi cation for the choice of these nonlinearities is given in the paper VAU95 in this volume, which shows that other choices would have given a much weaker cipher.
One of the novel features of SAFER was the use of a new linear transform to provide the di usion" that a good cipher requires, i.e., to ensure that small changes in each round input result in large changes in the round output. We called this transform the Pseudo-Hadamard Transform PHT as it di ers from the conventional Hadamard or Walsh-Hadamard transform only enough to make it invertible over the ring of integers modulo 256. Again we have been questionned, sometimes skeptically, as to how good this di usion is. In Section 4, we give a detailed discussion of the di using capability of the PHT, not only to answer these questions but also because the results are essential to the cryptanalysis in Section 6. We were remiss in MAS94 in not mentionning two earlier applications in cryptography of transform techniques similar to the Hadamard transform and we are pleased to remedy this omission here. Huber HUB90 also used the butter y with decimation" structure of the Hadamard transform within an encryption round to provide di usion, but replaced the linear butter ys" with two input two output nonlinear functions to obtain the required invertibility of the transform. Schnorr, in a paper presented in the rump session at CRYPTO '91, cf. SCH92 , used the butter y with decimation" structure of the fast Walsh-Hadamard transform to obtain di usion within a hashing function.
For a cipher to gain popularity, there must be a general belief that it is secure'. The resistance of a cipher to di erential cryptanalysis, introduced by Biham and Shamir BIH90 , is perhaps the best measure available today of its security.We are aware of several privately conducted and proprietary di erential cryptanalyses of SAFER, all of which have reached the conclusion that SAFER is secure against di erential cryptanalysis, but there has been some disagreement about how many rounds of SAFER are required for this security. In MAS94 , we recommended the use of six rounds in SAFER K 64 but allowed optionally up to ten rounds. In Section 6 we give our own detailed di erential cryptanalysis, which shows that six rounds of SAFER K 64 su ces for protection against di erential cryptanalysis. The next best measure today of a cipher's security is its resistance to linear cryptanalysis, introduced by Matsui MAT93, ? . We have had no reports from others on the strength of SAFER against linear cryptanalysis, but together with our students PER94, ?, ? we have undertaken the linear cryptanalysis of SAFER. Because of the lengthy treatment that is required to do justice to the di erential cryptanalysis of SAFER, we will not discuss this work further here, except to mention that it indicates that SAFER is even more secure against linear cryptanalysis than against di erential cryptanalysis, which is the reverse of the situation for DES.
Very recently, Knudsen KNU95 has pointed out a`weakness' in SAFER when this cipher is used within a public hashing scheme. We discuss this`weakness' in Section 7 where we also give a speci cation for its avoidance. We close in Section 8 with some remarks.
SAFER K 128
SAFER K 64 with r rounds uses 2r+1 64 bit subkeys that are derived from the 64 bit user selected key according to the key schedule shown in Fig. 1 . We now de ne SAFER K 128 as the cipher whose encryption round structure, output transformation and key biases are identical to those of SAFER K 64 but whose 2r + 1 64 bit subkeys are derived from the 128 bit user selected key according to the key schedule shown in Fig. 2 . As mentioned above, this latter key schedule was designed by the Special Projects Team of the Ministry of Home A airs, Singapore. We recommend that r = 10 rounds of encryption be used with SAFER K 128 and specify that not more than 12 rounds be used.
The left and right halves of the 128 bit user selected key are denoted as K a and K b , respectively, in Fig. 2 where, as in MAS94 , we abide by the convention that more signi cant bits and bytes are to the left. Upon comparing Figs. 1 and 2, one sees immediately that if the righthalf key K b in Fig. 2 coincides with the 64 bit user selected key K 1 in Fig. 1 , then the same subkeys K 1 , K 3 , K 5 , ... are generated by both key algorithms. Similarly, if the lefthalf key K a in Fig. 2 coincides with the 64 bit user selected key K 1 in Fig. 1 , then the same subkeys K 2 , K 4 , K 6 , ... are generated by both key algorithms. Thus, when both K a and K b in Fig. 2 coincide with the 64 bit user selected key K 1 in Fig. 1 , then all subkeys produced by both key schedules are the same. This is a very desirable feature as it permits a user with an implementation of SAFER K 128 to encipher and decipher for SAFER K 64 whenever desired.
Appendix B contains a TURBO PASCAL program that implements encryption for the full r-round SAFER K 128 cipher. This program should be taken as the o cial de nition of the SAFER K 128 encryption algorithm. Appendix C gives two examples of 12 round encryption i.e., r = 12 that the reader may nd useful in checking his or her own implementation of this cipher. 
The Nonlinearities of SAFER
We begin by recalling the encryption round structure of SAFER shown in Fig. 3 . The rst step within the i-th round is the Mixed XOR Byte-Addition of the round input with the subkey K 2i,1 . The eight resulting bytes are then individually subjected to one of two di erent transformations, namely: 1 the operation labelled 45 : " in Fig. 3 to denote that if the input byte is the integer j then the output byte is 45 j modulo 257 except that this output is taken to be 0 if if the modular result is 256, which occurs for j = 128 and 2 the operation labelled log 45 " in Fig. 3 to denote that if the byte is the integer j then the output byte is log 45 j except that this output is taken to be 128 if the input is j = 0, i.e., the power to which one must raise 45 to obtain j modulo 257.
Because 257 is a prime, arithmetic modulo 257 is the arithmetic of the nite eld GF257. The element 45 is a primitive element of this eld, i.e., its rst 256 powers generate all 256 non zero eld elements. Thus the mapping 45 : is an invertible mapping from one byte to one byte. The mapping log 45 : is just the inverse of the mapping 45 : . To see just how nonlinear" these two mappings are or, better, how closely they resemble a randomly chosen" mapping, we consider for each mapping the boolean functions that determine each output bit in terms of the eight input bits. Any boolean function of 8 input bits, say f:, has an algebraic normal form ANF of the type fx 1 ;x 2 ;...x 8 = a 0 + a 1 x 1 + a 2 x 2 + + a 8 x 8 +a 1;2 x 1 x 2 + a 1;3 x 1 x 3 + + a 7;8 x 7 x 8 + + a 1;2;3;4;5;6;7;8 x 1 x 2 x 3 x 4 x 5 x 6 x 7 x 8 : 1 The coe cients on the right are elements of the nite eld GF2 and the addition is addition in this eld, which is just the XOR operation. The nonlinear order of a product of variables is the number of variables in that product; the nonlinear order of the function itself is the maximum nonlinear order of a product of variables appearing with a non zero coe cient in its ANF. Each boolean function of eight bits uniquely determines the coe cients of its ANF and, conversely, any choice of these coe cients determines such a function. Choosing such a function f uniformly at random from the set of all 2 256 such functions is thus equivalent to choosing the coe cients on the right in 1 by coin tossing.
It follows that, in a randomly chosen function, the number of terms of nonlinear order i that appear is binomially distributed from 0 to It is interesting to observe that the number of terms of nonlinear order i in the least signi cant bit bit 8 function for the mapping log ! : is invariant to the choice of primitive element ! in GF257. The reason is that, independently of the choice of !, ! k is a quadratic residue or square" just when k is even and hence its logarithm will have least signi cant bit 0 just in this case. But if ! is primitive in GF257, = ! i is also primitive if and only if i is odd. Hence any non zero in GF257 is an even power of ! if and only if it is an even power of and thus the least sign cant bit functions in the mappings log ! :
and log : coincide. In general, however, all the other output bit functions of the mapping log ! : and all the output bit functions of the mapping ! : will depend on the choice of !. However, the variation with ! is not substantial| our conclusions about Tables 1 and 2 would still apply had we chosen any other primitive element, say ! = 3, of GF257 to de ne the exponential and logarithmic mappings and SAFER so modi ed would be essentially as secure as for our choice of ! = 45. This choice was rather arbitrary and was motivated primarily by the apparent randomness" in the sequence of key biases that it produces, cf. MAS94 .
Pseuo-Hadamard Transform
The purpose of the Pseudo-Hadamard Transform PHT section in Fig. 3 is to provide SAFER with di usion, i.e., to ensure that small changes in round inputs cause large changes in round outputs. Because the PHT is linear over the ring of integers modulo 256 and because di erences" can be taken conveniently as byte di erences modulo 256 at the output of the eight nonlinear channels in Fig. 3 , di usion is well measured by how well the PHT converts low weight inputs into high weight inputs. Here and hereafter, weight means the number of non-zero bytes. We now treat this question in some detail as the results are essential to the di erential cryptanalysis that will be carried out in Section 6. 8 4 4 2 4 2 2 1 4 2 4 2 2 1 2 1 4 2 2 1 4 2 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 4 4 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 3 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 5 2 is the 8 8 matrix that we will refer to as the PHT matrix. The i-th row of M is just the PHT V of the input row v that is all-zero except in the i-th byte where it contains a 1. From 2, the action of the PHT matrix M on the inputs v of weight 1 is evident. These results are given in Table 4 Similarly, it is easy to check that there are 3 di erent weight 1 inputs that give weight 2 outputs, none whatsoever that give weight 3 outputs, and only 5 that give weight 4 outputs. One sees from Table 4 that the PHT di uses weight 1 inputs exceedingly well.
The situation is not so much di erent for weight 2 inputs. In Table 6 we list all 33 weight 2 inputs that produce a PHT of weight between 1 and 3 inclusive. In particular, we note that only three weight 2 inputs produce an output of weight 1. There are nine weight 2 inputs that produce outputs also of weight 2, the most interesting of these being 0; 128; 0; 128; 0; 0; 0; 0 , 0; 0; 128; 0; 0; 0; 128; 0 and 0; 0; 0; 0; 128; 128; 0; 0 , all of which reproduce themselves. Such replicating patterns might well represent a weakness" that one could exploit in di erential cryptanalysis were it not for the fact, which will be seen in Section 6, that byte di erences of 128 cannot propagate unchanged through the nonlinear section of SAFER. From Table 4 one must conclude that the PHT also di uses weight 2 inputs admirably well.
There are roughly 2 13 weight 2 inputs, which is a fraction about 2 ,9 of the total number of weight 2 inputs, that produce PHT outputs of weight 4. There are 9 isolated" weight 2 inputs, listed in Table 5 , that produce weight 4 outputs, but these are of little use in di erential cryptanalysis because of the plethora of 128's in the output|here "isolated" refers to the fact that the only non zero multiples of these inputs that have weight 4 and produce weight 4 outputs are the trivial multiples by 1 and ,1. The remaining weight 2 inputs play a rather important role in the di erential cryptanalysis of SAFER in Section 6|we call them one-dimensional weight 2 inputs to emphasize that they appear in sets containing all the non zero multiples of some weight 2 input, excluding possibly the non zero multiples by 64, 128 and -64 when these have the e ect of reducing either the weight of the input or the weight of the output, or both. This makes it possible to tabulate all these inputs in a compact way as we have done in Table 7 . The last entry in this table indicates, for example, that all the non zero multiples of 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; 0; ,1; 2 , whose PHT is 0; 0; 1; 1; 0; 0; 1; 1 , are weight 2 inputs, except the multiple by 128, and produce weight 4 outputs.
There are no weight 3 inputs that give a PHT of weight 1. The lists of weight 3 inputs that produce PHT outputs with weights 2 and 3 are given in Tables 9 and 10 , respectively. It is evident that the PHT di uses even weight 3 inputs very well.
We will also have use in the di erential cryptanalysis of SAFER for the list of weight 4 inputs that give a PHT of weight 1. There are only ve of these and they are listed in Table 8 .
Recognition of Certain Markov Ciphers
Di erential cryptanalysis, originated by Biham and Shamir BIH90 , is a general attack on iterated ciphers, i.e., on ciphers that consist of many applications in cascade of the same round function. Our discussion of di erential cryptanalysis will follow the treatment in LAI91 , which introduced and exploited the notion of a Markov cipher.
Di erential cryptanalysis requires that one specify a notion of di erence for round inputs and round outputs. In an iterated cipher, the round input and round output must take values in the same set G. In general, one can specify the di erence X between two round inputs or two round outputs X and X ?
in the manner
where is a group operation on G and where X ? ,1 denotes the group inverse of X ? . The cipher is then said to be a Markov cipher if, when the round key is chosen uniformly at random and applied to two distinct round inputs X and X ? , the conditional probability PY = j X = ;X = for the di erence of the corresponding distinct round outputs Y and Y ? is independent of . In other words, the conditional probability of an output di erence depends only on the input di erence and not on the particular value of either input. It was shown in LAI91 that, for a Markov cipher in which the round keys are chosen independently and uniformly at random which is the universal assumption in di erential cryptanalysis , the sequence of round di erences is a Markov chain for which the uniform probability distribution is a stationary distribution. It follows that if this Markov chain has a steady-state probability distribution, then this must also be the uniform distribution. We now prove a proposition that is very useful in identifying many commonly used block ciphers as Markov ciphers. 6 Di erential Cryptanalysis of SAFER As can be seen from Fig. 3 , at the beginning of a round, SAFER combines the 8 byte round input X = X 1 ;X 2 ; . . . X 8 bytewise with the 8 byte rst half Z a = Z a1 ;Z a2 ;...Z a8 of the round key to produce the 8-byte input S = S 1 ;S 2 ; . . . S 8 to the nonlinear operations in the manner that S = X Z a where = ; +; +; ; ; +; +; ; here denotes the bitwise XOR operation on bytes and + denotes usual byte addition, i.e., addition modulo 256. It follows that is a group operation on the set G of 8 byte words. We then obtain as an immediate consequence of where Z a and Z b are the left and right halves of the round key, respectively. We thus refer to bytes 1, 4, 5, and 8 as the exponential bytes. Similarly, one notes that S j = log 45 X j + Z aj Z bj ; j2 f2; 3; 6; 7g 8 and we thus refer to bytes 2, 3, 6 and 7 as the logarithmic bytes. We will call a pair ; , considered as the value of X j ;S j , an exponential byte di erential for j 2 f1; 4; 5; 8g and a logarithmic byte di erential for j 2 f2; 3; 6; 7g. Of interest greater than that of the exponential byte di erentials are the exponential byte quasi di erentials where the output di erence is taken as the modulo 256 di erenceS j rather than as the XOR di erence S j .
The principal properties of the byte di erentials and quasi di erentials are summarized in Table 3 . When a di erence V orV is a modulo 256 di erence, then interchanging the inputs X and X ? negates this di erence but has no e ect on di erences V that are XOR di erences. It follows that for logarithmic byte di erentials, where both input and output di erences are modulo 256 di erences, PS = j X = = PS =, j X =, :
Similarly for exponential byte quasi di erentials, where only the output di erence is modulo 256, PS = j X = = PS =, j X = :
These two facts are stated in the rst section of Table 3 . The other entries in this table were determined by direct computation of the transition probabilities PS = j X = and PS = j X = with the help of 7 and 8 when the bytes Z aj and Z bj are chosen uniformly at random over the 256 possible byte values. It will be convenient in the di erential cryptanalysis of SAFER to have available the relations between byte di erentials and byte quasi-di erentials that are given in the following proposition. The simple relation 9 is the primary reason that it is more natural to use quasidi erentials rather than ordinary di erentials in the di erential cryptanalysis of SAFER.
One round and two round quasi-di erentials
We now get to the heart of the di erential cryptanalysis of SAFER, i.e., to the nding of the most probable r , 1-round quasi-di erentials for r = 2; 3; . . .. It was shown in LAI91 that an r-round cipher is immune from di erential cryptanalysis just when all its r , 1-round di erentials or quasi-di erentials are essentially equally likely. Thus, SAFER is immune from di erential cryptanalysis when X;Yr , 1 takes on every possible value ; with probability about 1=2 64 , 1 2 ,64 when X = Y0 = is the plaintext and Yi is the output of the i-th round. It is convenient for a one-round quasi-di erential Xi;Yi to consider also the PHT input Si at mid round. To emphasize the role of Si, we will write one round quasi di erentials in expanded view as Xi;Si;Yi. It follows from 9 that Yi = SiM where M is the PHT matrix of 2. The probability of the transition from Xi toYi is just the probability of the transition from Xi toSi because the transition fromSi toYi is deterministic. Note that the probability of a transition from Xi toSi is the product of the probabilities of the byte di erentials in the logarithmic bytes and the byte quasi di erentials in the exponential bytes for the corresponding bytes of Xi andSi. It follows then from consideration of Table 3 that the probability of such a transition decreases as the number of bytes speci ed inSi increases, which number will generally be the same as the weight of Xi. Finding high probability quasi di erentials for several rounds is thus mostly a matter of nding quasi di erentials whose evolution has input di erences of weight as small as possible in every round. To a good rst approximation, the probability of an i round quasi di erential decreases as the total weight of the round inputs increases. Table 3 , which directly gives the probability of one round byte di erentials and quasi di erentials, immediately provides the justi cation of the following two claims in which, for brevity here and later, we have written 0 j to denote j successive zero bytes. ; 128 has probability 2 ,5 and is a most likely 1 round di erential for SAFER.
It follows from Table 3 that there are 48 such most probable di erentials since again any of the four exponential bytes could be chosen as the single non-zero byte and since there are 12 pairs of values for these non-zero bytes of X1 andS1 that have this same maximum probability.
Claims 1 and 2 illustrate interestingly that the most likely one round quasi di erential is slightly more probable than the most likely one round di erential, which is another argument in favor of considering the former type of`di erential' rather than the latter.
Finding the most probable two-round quasi di erential is not much more di cult. ; 1 ; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1; 1 has probability 2 ,12 and is a most likely 2 round quasi di erential for SAFER. This claim requires more justi cation. Recall from the discussion in Section 5 that di erences at round inputs must be of the type X rather than of the typẽ X. Thus, one cannot immediately setY1 equal to X2. However, when each component ofY1 is either 0 or 128, it follows from Proposition 4 that this equality does hold. From Table 4 , we recall that there is a unique PHT input of weight 1, namely 128; 0
7
, that gives an output also of weight 1, namely 0 7 ;128 . Thus, the two-round quasi-di erential in Claim 3 is the unique up to the choice of an odd byte value for the bytes of Y2, which we have arbitrarily taken as 1 such two-round quasi-di erential that has weight 1 inputs to each round|thus it has maximum probability. This probability is the product of the transition probability 2 ,5 from the 18 in the rst byte which is an exponential byte of X1 to the 128 in the rst byte ofS1 and the transition probability 2 ,7 from the 128 in the eighth byte which is also an exponential byte of X2 to the 1 in the eighth byte ofS2. There are 9128 = 1152 such most probable two-round quasi-di erentials, corresponding to the 9 choices seen in Table 3 for the rst byte of X1 and to the 128 choices of an odd number for the eighth byte ofS2.
Three round quasi di erentials
Finding the most probable three round quasi di erential is a much more intricate matter. We begin by stating the solution. ; has probability 2 ,41:6 and is a most likely 3 round quasi di erential for SAFER.
We rst show that this three round quasi di erential has the claimed probability 2 ,41:6 . From Table 3 we see that the transition from 18 to 128 in an exponential byte has probability 2 ,5 , which is thus the probability of the rst round transition. Because each byte ofY1 is either 0 or 128, it follows from Proposition 4 that X2 coincides withY1. The second round requires transitions in logarithmic bytes 2 and 6 from 128 to b and ,b, respectively, where b can be any odd number. All byte transitions are independent because the corresponding keys for each byte are independent. A direction computation gives X b odd P log b j 128P log ,b j 128 = 2 ,7:4 where P log b j a is the probability of the byte quasi di erential X;S = a; b. Again from Table 3 we see that the transitions from 128 to b and ,b which is also odd in exponential bytes 4 and 8 each have probability 2 ,7 . Thus the transition in round two has probability 2 ,7:4+7+7 = 2 ,21:4 . It follows further from Proposition 4 that an odd value b in exponential byte 1 ofY2 will give an odd value c, not necessarily the same as b, in byte 1 of X3. From Table 3 , we see that the transition from b in logarithmic byte 3 of X3 to 128 in byte 3 of S3 has probability 2 ,7 . The probability of the transition from the odd c in exponential byte 1 of X3 to 128 in byte 1 ofS3 can be well approximated by the average probability for such c, which from Table 3 is seen to be 2 ,8:2 . Hence, the transition in round 3 has probability essentially equal to 2 ,15:2 . The probability of the 3 round di erential in the claim is thus It is interesting to note that the above 3 round di erential consists of 128 di erent "characteristics" to use the language of Biham and Shamir BIH90 , one for each odd byte value b that speci es the four non zero bytes ofS2. An i round characteristic is a sequence consisting of the rst round input and the outputs of rounds 1, 2, ... i. The probability of a di erential is the sum of the probabilities of all the characteristics of which it is composed. It is often the case that the probability of a di erential is dominated, and thus well approximated, by the probability of its most likely characteristic. However, many of its 128 characteristics contribute substantially to the probabilility of the di erential in Claim 4.
We now begin the rather tedious, but essential, task of showing that the 3 round di erential in Claim 4 does indeed have maximum probability. Note that the sum of the weights of the three round inputs is 7|thus our task is to show that there exists no 3 round di erentials having round inputs whose weights sum to 6 or less and that any whose weights sum to 7 have probability no greater than that in Claim 4.
We begin by considering di erentials for which the rst round input has weight 1. If the second round input also has weight 1, then the second round output must have weight 8|as follows from the proof of Claim 3|and hence the di erential has very low probability. Suppose then that the second round input has weight 2. From Table 4 we see that the two non zero bytes must be bytes 4 and 8, or bytes 6 and 8, or bytes 7 and 8. But the third round input cannot then have weight 1 since, by Table 6 , the two non zero bytes in the round 2 input would then have had to be bytes 1 and 2, or bytes 1 and 3, or bytes 1 and 5. Nor could the third round input have weight 2, since Table 6 shows that the two non zero bytes in the round 2 input would then have had to be bytes 2 and 3, or bytes 2 and 4, or bytes 2 and 5, or bytes 2 and 6, or bytes 3 and 4, or bytes 3 and 5, or bytes 3 and 7, or bytes 5 and 6, or bytes 5 and 7. Nor could the third round input have weight 3, since Table 6 shows that the two non zero bytes in the round 2 input would then have had to be bytes 1 and 2, or bytes 1 and 3, or bytes 1 and 4, or bytes 1 and 5, or bytes 1 and 6, or bytes 1 and 7. The third round input can indeed have weight 4, which gives round input weights that sum to 7, but to give larger probability than the di erential in Claim 4 at least three of the non zero bytes would have to be logarithmic bytes|Table 7 shows that all four bytes then must be logarithmic bytes bytes 2, 3, 6 and 7 and that the two non zero bytes in the round 2 input would have had to be bytes 2 and 5, or bytes 4 and 7, which is again a contradiction. That the second round input cannot have weight 3 follows immediately from Table 4 . Still considering a weight 1 rst round input, suppose that the second round input has weight 4. From Table 4 , these non zero bytes must be bytes 4, 6, 7 and 8, or bytes 2, 4, 6 and 8, or bytes 3, 4, 7 and 8, or bytes 5, 6, 7 and 8. It follows then from Table 8 that the third round input cannot have weight 1. The third round input can indeed have weight 2, which gives round input weights that again sum to 7, but the probability of such a di erential will not be larger than that of the di erential in Claim 4 since only two of the four non-zero bytes in the round 2 input are logarithmic bytes. We conclude that no three round di erential with a weight 1 rst round input can have larger probability than the di erential in Claim 4.
We now consider the case where the rst round input has weight 2. Suppose that the second round input has weight 1. From Table 6 it follows that this non zero byte must be byte 4, or byte 6, or byte 7. It then follows further from Table 4 that the input to round three must have weight at least 4|when this weight is 4, the di erential is less probable than that in Claim 4 because there is no one dimensional" intermediate set of mid-round outputs. Suppose next that the second round input has weight 2. It then follows from Table 6 that the two non zero bytes in the second round input must be bytes 2 and 4, or bytes 2 and 6, or bytes 3 and 4, or bytes 3 and 7, or bytes 4 and 6, or bytes 4 and 7, or bytes 5 and 6, or bytes 5 and 7, or bytes 6 and 7. None of these pairs can give a third round input of weight 1 or weight 3 as follows from Table 6 . Several of these pairs can be seen from Table 6 to admit third-round inputs of weight 2 but require byte transitions from 128 to 128 in the second round and hence, by Table 3 , give probability 0 for the second round transition. The second round input can indeed have weight 4 and, in fact, the di erential of Claim 4 is of this type and was chosen to give a round 3 input of weight 1 via a one dimensional intermediate set of mid round outputs so as to maximize its probability in this class.
We now must consider the case when the rst round input has weight 3. Table 9 shows that weight 1 is impossible for the second round input and that weight 2 is possible only if the two non-zero bytes are bytes 2 and 8, or bytes 3 and 8, or bytes 4 and 8, or bytes 5 and 6, or bytes 6 and 8, or bytes 7 and 8. But, according to Table 6 , none of these pairs can lead of a third round input with weight less than 4. Hence, a three round di erential with rst round input of weight 3 will be much less probable than that in Claim 4.
That weight 4 rst round inputs cannot give a three round di erential with probability larger than that in Claim 4 will be evident from the treatment of 4 round di erentials that follows. First round inputs of weight 5 or more obviously need not be considered.
Four round quasi di erentials
In light of the lengthy argument required to establish Claim 4 for three round di erentials, the reader will be pleasantly surprised to see that the four round case follows from the former with very little additional work. In fact, the most likely four round di erential begins with the previously determined most likely three round di erential. ; 2; 1; 2; 1; 2; 1; 2; 1 has probability 2 ,48:6 and is a most likely 4 round quasi di erential for SAFER.
The probability of the fourth round transition is the probability of the byte quasi di erential 128, 1 where 1 could be replaced by any odd byte value , which from Table 3 is seen to be 2 ,7 . Thus, this four round di erential has probability 2 ,41:6 2 ,7 = 2 ,48:6 as claimed. Because the additional fourth round has a weight 1 input, essentially the same arguments as were just used for the 3 round case establish that this four round di erential likewise has maximum probability.
Note that the last three rounds of the above four round di erential constitute a three round di erential whose rst round input has weight 4. This is the most probable three-round di erential of this type, but its probability 2 ,43:6 is smaller by a factor of 4 than the di erential in Claim 4.
Five rounds and more quasi di erentials
It is an unrewardingly tedious task to try to determine precisely the most probable di erentials for SAFER for ve or more rounds. The four round di erential of Claim 5 ends with a weight-8 output and hence cannot be extended with an additional round to obtain a highly probable ve round di erential. Nor can an additional low weight round be placed before these four rounds. The analysis that we have done suggests that one will need to specify at least two more byte transitions to create a good ve round di erential than were necessary to specify in order to create the most likely four round di erential. One expects very conservatively that the probability of the most probable ve round di erential di ers by a factor of 2 ,8 the average probability of a byte transition or less from that of the most probably four round di erential. With virtually no doubt then, the most probable ve round di erential for SAFER will have probability at most 2 ,57 . This is close enough to the average di erential probability of 2 ,64 that the attack to nd the key of six round SAFER K 64 by di erential cryptanalysis would require more computation than a brute force exhaustive key search. For this reason, we abide by our original recommendation of six rounds with a maximum of ten rounds for SAFER K 64. For six round SAFER K 128, however, exhaustive key search would be much more complex than the attack by di erential cryptanalysis, which is why we have recommended at least ten rounds with a maximum of twelve rounds be used with this cipher. It could mislead users were we to allow a 128 bit key rather than a 64 bit key when the security against di erential cryptanalysis would not be substantially enhanced by the longer key. 7 A Hashing`Weakness' in SAFER Having announced a freely available and non proprietary cipher, we consider it our responsibility to inform present and prospective users of this cipher should any signi cant weaknesses be found in it. The rst such`weakness' of which we are aware was discovered by Knudsen KNU95 two months after the oral presentation of this paper and concerns the use of SAFER for hashing.
It is not uncommon to use secret-key ciphers within a public hashing scheme, cf. LAI93 . The strength of the cipher for such hashing depends on the di culty of producing`collisions', i.e., of nding two distinct plaintext key pairs that yield the same ciphertext. When the plaintext and ciphertext are 64 bit strings, the median number of distinct plaintext key pairs that must be chosen uniformly at random before such a collision is found is about 2
32
. By some very clever cryptanalysis, Knudsen devised a method to produce such collisions for six round SAFER K 64 after choosing only about 2 24 distinct plaintext key pairs, i.e., about 256 times as fast as by random guessing. Because SAFER K 128 reduces to SAFER K 64 when the two halves of the 128 bit key coincide, Knudsen's attack also applies to SAFER K 128.
Knudsen exploited the fact, which can be seen from Fig. 1 for SAFER K 64, that changing one byte of the secret key K 1 changes only the byte in this same position in all 2r + 1 round keys. This fact appears to be irrelevant for encryption because of the di using e ect of the PHT, cf. Section 4, but it has signi cant implications for hashing. Two round keys di ering in only one byte will sometimes encrypt a round input to the the same round output. Knudsen was able to select two secret keys di ering in only one byte in such a way that both keys encrypt between 2 22 and 2 28 plaintexts in the same way for six rounds. This is the phenomenon that he exploited to produce collisions about 256 times faster than by random guessing when six round SAFER is used within standard hashing schemes. He also found pairs of secret keys that encrypt about 2 15 plaintexts in the same way for eight rounds, but this is not enough to give an advantage over random guessing in producing collisions. H also determined that there are no pairs of secret keys that encrypt many plaintexts in the same way for ten or more rounds.
Knudsen KNU95 suggested a new key schedule that could be used with SAFER" and would completely remove the hashing`weakness' that he exploited, but that is somewhat more complicated than the original key schedules, which are described in Section 2. Although adopting Knudsen's key schedule would certainly be a more elegant cure for the hashing`weakness' in SAFER, it seems preferable to us in deference to the many users who have already implemented SAFER in software or in silicon to abide by the original and simpler key schedules and merely to specify that at least ten rounds of SAFER be used whenever SAFER is embedded in a hashing scheme so that the hashing`weakness' vanishes.
Concluding Remarks
We have attempted in the above to give a fairly complete picture of present knowledge concerning the security of SAFER. We will continue our own analysis of SAFER and will disseminate as rapidly as possible any`weaknesses' in SAFER that we ourselves nd or that are brought to our attention.
It is a pleasure here to acknowledge the contributions of the following Armenian scientists to the di erential cryptanalysis of SAFER that was reported here: G. H. Khachatrian, M. K. Kuregian, and S. S. Martirossian. Their earlier studies, to which we were privy, were very helpful to us, but the responsibility for any errors in the analysis given in this paper rests of course with us.
A Tables of PHT correspondences 4 6 a -a 2 4 5 7 -a -a a a 0 4 7 a -a 2 3 6 7 -a a -a a 0 4 8 a -a 1 3 5 7 a a a a 0 4 8 -a 2a 2 4 6 8 a a a a 0, 128 5 6 a -a 1 2 5 6 2a 2a a a 0, 128 5 6 -a 2a 3 4 7 8 2a 2a a a 0, 128 5 7 a -a 1 2 3 4 2a 2a a a 0, 128 5 7 -a 2a 5 6 7 8 2a 2a a a 0, 128 5 8 -a 2a 1 2 7 8 -2a -2a a a 0, 128 6 7 a -a 3 4 5 6 a a -a -a 0 6 8 a -a 1 2 3 4 a a a a 0 6 8 -a 2a 5 6 7 8 a a a a 0, 128 7 8 a -a 1 2 5 6 a a a a 0 7 8 -a 2a 3 4 7 8 a a a a 0, 128 a2,a3,a4,a5,a6,a7,a8, b1,b2,b3,b4,b5,b6, fEach byte of keys Ka and Kb is further left rotated by 6.g ka j := ka j shl 6 + ka j shr 2; kb j := kb j shl 6 + kb j shr 2; fThe key biases are added to give the keys K2i and K2i+1.g k 2*i,j := ka j + exptab exptab 18*i+j ; k 2*i+1,j := kb j + exptab exptab 18*i+9+j ; END; END; FOR i:= 1 TO r DO fThe r rounds of encryption begin here.g BEGIN fKey 2i-1 is mixed bit and byte added to the round input.g a1:= a1 xor k 2*i-1,1 ; a2:= a2 + k 2*i-1,2 ; a3:= a3 + k 2*i-1,3 ; a4:= a4 xor k 2*i-1,4 ; a5:= a5 xor k 2*i-1,5 ; a6:= a6 + k 2*i-1,6 ; a7:= a7 + k 2*i-1,7 ; a8:= a8 xor k 2*i-1,8 ; fThe result now passes through the nonlinear layer.g b1:=exptab a1 ;b2:=logtab a2 ;b3:=logtab a3 ;b4:=exptab a4 ; b5:=exptab a5 ;b6:=logtab a6 ;b7:=logtab a7 ;b8:=exptab a8 ; fKey 2i is now mixed byte and bit added to the result.g b1:= b1 + k 2*i,1 ; b2:= b2 xor k 2*i,2 ; b3:= b3 xor k 2*i,3 ; b4:= b4 + k 2*i,4 ; b5:= b5 + k 2*i,5 ; b6:= b6 xor k 2*i,6 ; b7:= b7 xor k 2*i,7 ; b8:= b8 + k 2*i,8 ; fThe PHT of the result is now computed to complete the round.g mat1b1, b2, a1, a2; mat1b3, b4, a3, a4; mat1b5, b6, a5, a6; mat1b7, b8, a7, a8; mat1a1, a3, b1, b2; mat1a5, a7, b3, b4; mat1a2, a4, b5, b6; mat1a6, a8, b7, b8; mat1b1, b3, a1, a2; mat1b5, b7, a3, a4; mat1b2, b4, a5, a6; mat1b6, b8, a7, a8; writeln'after round',i:2,a1:8,a2:4,a3:4,a4:4,a5:4,a6:4,a7:4,a8:4; END; fKey 2r+1 is now mixed bit and byte added to form the cryptogram.g a1:= a1 xor k 2*r+1,1 ; a2:= a2 + k 2*r+1,2 ; a3:= a3 + k 2*r+1,3 ; a4:= a4 xor k 2*r+1,4 ; a5:= a5 xor k 2*r+1,5 ; a6:= a6 + k 2*r+1,6 ; a7:= a7 + k 2*r+1,7 ; a8:= a8 xor k 2*r+1,8 ; writeln'CRYPTOGRAM is',a1:8,a2:4,a3:4,a4:4,a5:4,a6:4,a7:4,a8:4;writeln; writeln'Type 1 & CR to continue, 0 & CR to stop.';readln ag; END UNTIL ag = 0; END. 
C Examples of SAFER K 128 Encryption

